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A Double Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd
Sensing with Data Reuse
Xiaoru Zhang, Lin Gao, Bin Cao, Zhang Li, and Mengjing Wang
Abstract—Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm
of sensing, which can achieve a flexible and scalable sensing
coverage with a low deployment cost, by employing mobile
users/devices to perform sensing tasks. In this work, we pro-
pose a novel MCS framework with data reuse, where multiple
tasks with common data requirement can share (reuse) the
common data with each other through an MCS platform. We
study the optimal assignment of mobile users and tasks (with
data reuse) systematically, under both information symmetry
and asymmetry, depending on whether the user cost and the
task valuation are public information. In the former case, we
formulate the assignment problem as a generalized Knapsack
problem and solve the problem by using classic algorithms.
In the latter case, we propose a truthful and optimal double
auction mechanism, built upon the above Knapsack assignment
problem, to elicit the private information of both users and tasks
and meanwhile achieve the same optimal assignment as under
information symmetry. Simulation results show by allowing data
reuse among tasks, the social welfare can be increased up to
100% ∼ 380%, comparing with those without data reuse. We
further show that the proposed double auction is not budget
balance for the auctioneer, mainly due to the data reuse among
tasks. To this end, we further introduce a reserve price into the
double auction (for each data item) to achieve a desired tradeoff
between the budget balance and the social efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
The proliferation of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) with
rich embedded sensors has led to a novel sensing paradigm
known as Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) [1], where mobile
users/devices are employed to perform different sensing tasks.
By crowdsourcing the sensing capabilities of massive powerful
mobile devices, this new sensing paradigm can achieve a
high sensing coverage with a low deploying cost, hence has
attracted a wide range of applications in environment, infras-
tructure, and community monitoring (e.g., [2]–[12]).
A typical MCS framework mainly consists of the following
three parts [1]: (i) a set of task planners, who initiate sensing
tasks with specific data requirements, (ii) a set of mobile
users, who report their capabilities and interests for performing
different tasks, and (iii) an MCS platform, who collects the
information of tasks and users, and assigns tasks to users
carefully. When a user is assigned with a task, he performs the
task accordingly using his device resource (e.g., CPU cycles
Authors are with the School of Electronic and Information Engineering,
Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen, China. Lin Gao is the Correspond-
ing Author. Email: gaol@hit.edu.cn.
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Founda-
tion of China (Grant No. 61771162 and 61501211) and the Basic Re-
search Project of Shenzhen (Grant No. JCYJ20160531192013063 and
JCYJ20170307151148585).
8VHU 
'DWD 5HTXLUHG
E\ 7DVN 
8VHU 
8VHU 


'DWD
+RQJ .RQJ









'DWD
'DWD 5HTXLUHG
E\ 7DVN 
Fig. 1. An MCS model with common data requirement among tasks. Tasks
1 and 2 require the common data set {1, 2, 3}.
and energy for sensing and processing data, bandwidth and
energy for sending data to the task planner), which will incur
a certain cost on the user. Meanwhile, the user can obtain a
certain reward from the task planner via the platform according
to a certain pre-defined payment rule.
Some prior works (e.g., [13]–[19]) have studied the general
MCS model with multiple tasks and multiple users from dif-
ferent aspects, such as how to assign tasks to users efficiently,
how to determine the rewards for users and the payments
from tasks properly, and so on. Most of the existing works
(i.e., [13]–[18]) focused on the MCS model without data reuse
among tasks, where the same data required by multiple tasks
cannot be shared (reused) among tasks and has to be sensed
distinctly for each task. In practice, however, it is highly likely
that different tasks require (hence can reuse) some common
data [19]. For example, the weather data at a particular time
and location may be required by the weather app (task 1), the
travel app (task 2), and the road navigation app (task 3). Thus,
without data reuse, it is likely to cause duplicated data sensing
and processing, leading to resource waste and performance
degradation. For this purpose, some practical MCS platforms
such as PRISM [20] and Medusa [21] have allowed task
planners to define data requirements in a standard language,
such that the common data (requirement) of different tasks can
be identified and reused potentially.
In [19], Jiang et al. studied the MCS model with data reuse
among tasks, which allows multiple tasks with the common
data requirement to share the common data with each other.
They proposed a randomized auction mechanism, which is
truthful in expectation and approximately optimal in term of
social welfare. In this work, we consider a similar MCS model
which allows data reuse among tasks, but our purpose is to
design a mechanism which is strictly truthful and optimal.
B. Model and Problem
In this work, we study a general multi-task multi-user MCS
model with data reuse, where different tasks can have common
data requirements and reuse the common data. Specifically,
each task is associated with a set of data items that it requires,
and the overlap of different tasks’ data sets is the common data
requirement of those tasks. Each user is associated with a set
of data items that he can sense, and such a sensing capability
depends on factors such as location, device capability, budget
constraint, and so on.
Figure 1 illustrates such an MCS model with common data
requirement (and data reuse) among tasks. Each blue circle
denotes a particular data item (e.g., specific information at
a particular time and location), and the dash line between
a user and a data item denotes that the user can sense the
data item. Each ellipse denotes the data items interested and
required by each task. Obviously, tasks 1 and 2 require the
common data set {1, 2, 3}, hence can potentially reuse those
data items {1, 2, 3}. It is easy to see that our model generalizes
the traditional model without data reuse in [13]–[18], as it can
degenerate to the traditional model by simply viewing each
common data required by multiple tasks as multiple virtual
data, each associated with a particular task.
In such an MCS model, we are interested in the following
Task-Data-User Assignment (TDU-A) problem:
• How to assign different users to sense different data of
different tasks, aiming at maximizing the social welfare,
taking the data reuse among tasks into consideration?
The social welfare is defined as the difference between the
total valuation of all completed tasks and the total sensing cost
of all employed users. More specifically, a task is completed
if and only if all of its required data items have been sensed
successfully, and the completion of a task will generate a
certain valuation for the task planner. A user will incur certain
sensing cost when he is scheduled to sense a data item, and
each user is associated with a budget, denoting the maximum
sensing cost that the user can afford.
Solving the above problem is challenging due to the follow-
ing reasons. First, from the technical perspective, a simplified
version of the problem (with a single user) is a Knapsack
problem [22] (which is NP-hard), where the total user budget
can be viewed as the knapsack capacity, and the sensing cost
for each data item can be viewed as the weight of the item. Be-
sides, involving the intermediate layer of data (between tasks
and users) will further complicate the problem. Second, from
the economic perspective, users may not be willing to report
their sensing costs and budgets truthfully, and task planners
may not be willing to report their valuations truthfully. Hence,
a well-designed incentive mechanism (e.g., VCG auction [23])
is necessary for eliciting the private information of both users
and task planners and making the assignment.
C. Solution and Contributions
We will solve the problem under both information symmetry
and asymmetry, depending on whether the user sensing cost
and budget and the task valuations are public information. In
the former case, all information are public and can be observed
by the platform. We formulate the assignment problem as
a generalized Knapsack problem and solve the problem by
using classic algorithms. In the latter case, the sensing cost
and budget are private information of each user, and the task
valuation is private information of each task planner, both
of which cannot be observed by the platform. We propose
a truthful double auction with the platform as the auctioneer
and users and task planners as bidders, which can elicit the
private information of users and task planners creditably, and
meanwhile achieve the same optimal social welfare as under
information symmetry.
We further show that the proposed double auction is not
budget balance for the auctioneer (platform), in the sense
that the total payment from all task planners may be smaller
than the total reward to all employed users. This implies that
the platform may need additional budget for organizing such
an auction, which is not desirable in practice. To avoid this,
we further introduce a reserve price to restrict the minimum
payment (of tasks) for each data item. We show that a desired
tradeoff between the budget balance and the social efficiency
can be achieved by turning the reserve price finely.
In summary, the main results and key contributions of this
work are summarized as follows.
• Novel MCS Model: We study a novel MCS model which
allows multiple tasks to reuse the common data. Com-
paring with the existing models without data reuse, this
new model can reduce the duplicated data sensing and
processing, hence increase the social efficiency.
• Truthful and Optimal Auction Design: We study the
optimal assignment problems under both information
symmetry and asymmetry. In particular, we propose a
truthful and optimal double auction under information
asymmetry, which can elicit the private information of
users/tasks creditably and achieve the same optimal social
welfare as under information symmetry.
• Performance Evaluations: Simulation results show by
allowing data reuse among tasks, the social welfare can
be increased up to 100% ∼ 380%, comparing with those
without data reuse. We further compare our approach
with that in [19], and show that our proposed double
auction (which is provably optimal) has an average of
10% performance gain over the randomized auction in
[19] (which is approximately optimal).
• Observations and Insights: We show that allowing data
reuse among tasks will reduce the competition of tasks,
hence reduce the payments of task planners. This may
lead to the undesired outcome of budget unbalance for the
platform. We further show that a well-designed reserve
price can achieve a desired tradeoff between the budget
balance and the social efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the system model. In Section III and IV, we analyze
the problem under information symmetry and asymmetry,
respectively. We present the simulation results in Section V,
and finally conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a multi-task multi-user MCS model, consisting
of a set I = {1, · · · , I} of mobile users, a set J = {1, · · · , J}
of tasks, and a set K = {1, · · · ,K} of target data items. Each
data item corresponds to a specific information at a particular
location and time.1 Each task j ∈ J is associated with a data
requirement, i.e., a set Kj ⊆ K of data items that it requires.
Each user i ∈ I is associated with a sensing capability, i.e., a
set Si ⊆ K of data items that he can sense. Note that different
tasks may have common data requirement, i.e., Kj1
⋂
Kj2 6=
∅, and can reuse the common data potentially.
In the example of Figure 1, we have: I = 3 users, J = 2
tasks, and K = 12 target data items. The data requirements
of both tasks are K1 = {1–7} and K2 = {1–3, 8–11}. The
sensing capabilities of three users are S1 = {1, 4–7}, S2 =
{1–3, 5, 8}, and S3 = {2, 3, 10–12}. Obviously, tasks 1 and 2
can reuse the common data set K1
⋂
K2 = {1, 2, 3}.
The system operates in the following way. First, each task
planner publishes the sensing task on the platform, indicating
the data requirement and task valuation (under certain incen-
tive mechanism). Each user reports the sensing interest on
the platform, indicating the sensing capability, sensing cost,
and sensing budget (under certain incentive mechanism). Then,
based on the information reported by task planners and users,
the platform decides the task-data-user assignment, aiming at
maximizing the social welfare.
B. User Model
Each user i ∈ I is associated with (i) a sensing capability
Si ⊆ K, denoting the set of data items that he can sense,
and (ii) a sensing cost vector ci , (ci,k, k ∈ Si), denoting
the cost for sensing each data item in Si.2 Such a sensing
cost mainly consists of the resource consumption for moving
to the target location, collecting and processing the data, and
transmitting the data to the task planner. Note that a user may
have different sensing costs for different data items, due to,
for example, the different distances to those data items or the
different capabilities for processing different data. Moreover,
each user i is associated with a sensing budget Ci > 0,
capturing the maximum resource that can be used for sensing.
Such a budget may depend on factors such as the user’s own
service requirement and resource availability. For example, a
user with a heavy burden of service or a low available device
resource may assign a low budget for sensing.
Let xi,k ∈ {0, 1} denote whether a user i ∈ I is scheduled
to sense a data item k ∈ Si, and xi , (xi,k, k ∈ Si) denote
1For example, a data item can be the temperature of a particular location
at 11:00pm everyday, the traffic of a highway at a particular time, or a raw
sensor reading such as GPS, light sensor, accelerometer, and gyroscope.
2For a data item k not in a user i’s sensing capability Si, we can say that
his sensing cost for data item k is infinite, i.e., ci,k = ∞,∀k /∈ Si.
the sensing scheduling vector of user i. Then, we have the
following budget constraint for user i:
∑
k⊆Si
xi,k · ci,k ≤ Ci (1)
Given the feasible scheduling vectors of all users, i.e., x ,
(xi, i ∈ I), the total incurred sensing cost on all users is:
C(x) =
∑
i∈I
∑
k⊆Si
xi,k · ci,k. (2)
C. Data Model
A data item is sensed successfully, if and only if it is sensed
by at least one user. Let Ik , {i ∈ I | k ∈ Si} denote the set
of users that can sense a data item k, and yk ∈ {0, 1} denote
whether a data item k ∈ K is sensed successfully. Then,
yk = max{xi,k, ∀i ∈ Ik}. (3)
In the example of Figure 1, we have: (i) I1 = {1, 2} and
y1 = max{x1,1, x2,1} for data item 1, (ii) I2 = {2, 3} and
y2 = max{x2,2, x3,2} for data item 2, and (iii) I4 = {1}
and y4 = x1,4 for data item 4. For convenience, we denote
y , (yk, k ∈ K) as the sensing indicators of all data items.
D. Task Model
Each task j ∈ J is associated with (i) a data requirement
Kj ⊆ K, denoting the set of data items that it requires, and
(ii) a task valuation vj > 0, denoting the value of task for the
task planner when the task is completed. A task j is completed
if and only if all of its required data items in Kj have been
successfully sensed by at least one user. Let zj ∈ {0, 1} denote
whether a task j ∈ J is completed. Then, for each task j ∈ J ,
we have the following completion indicator:
zj = min{yk, ∀k ∈ Kj}. (4)
In the example of Figure 1, we have: (i) K1 = {1–7} and
z1 = min{y1 · · · y7} for task 1 and (ii) K2 = {1–3, 8–11} and
z2 = min{y1, y2, y3, y8 · · · y11} for task 2.
Given the task completion indicators of all tasks, i.e., z ,
(zj , j ∈ J ), the total achieved valuation is:
V (z) =
∑
j∈J
zj · vj . (5)
E. Problem Formulation
The social welfare W (x, z) is defined as the difference
between the total valuation V (z) of all completed tasks and
the total sensing cost C(x) of all employed users, i.e.,
W (x, z) = V (z)− C(x). (6)
Our purpose is to decide the best task-data-user assignment
{x,y, z} that maximizes the social welfare, taking the po-
tential data reuse among tasks and the budget constraints of
users into considerations. Specifically, we can formulate the
joint task-data-user assignment problem (A1) as follows.
A1: max V (z)− C(x)
s.t. (1)(3)(4), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J , k ∈ K;
var. xi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Si;
zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J ;
yk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ K.
Here y = (yk, k ∈ K) is an intermediate variable indicating
whether a data item is sensed successfully, which connects the
tasks and users. It is easy to see that Problem P1 is a binary
integer linear programming problem.
However, solving the Problem A1 is challenging due to the
following reasons. First, it is a generalized Knapsack problem,
as a simplified version of the problem (with a single user) is
a Knapsack problem [22] (which is NP-hard), where the total
user budget can be viewed as the knapsack capacity, and the
sensing cost for each data item can be viewed as the weight
of the item. Second, it involves an intermediate data layer in
the assignment of users and tasks, leading to a three-layer
model, which makes the problem even more complicated and
challenging. Third, it requires the complete information of the
whole system, including the data requirements and valuations
of all tasks as well as the sensing capabilities, sensing costs,
and budgets of all users. However, such information can be
private information in practice, and task planners or users may
not be willing to report their private information truthfully.
Hence, we need to design a proper incentive mechanism to
elicit such private information.
In what follows, we first solve Problem A1 under infor-
mation symmetry where all information is public information
(Section III). Then we study Problem A1 under information
asymmetry where the above mentioned information is private
information of task planners and users (Section IV).
III. INFORMATION SYMMETRY
In this section, we consider the information symmetry sce-
nario, where all information is public information and can be
observed by the platform. Hence, the key problem is to solve
the optimal task-data-user assignment by the Problem A1.
We first show that the Problem A1 is a Knapsack problem
[22]. To show this, we consider a simplified model with J
tasks, each requiring a distinct data item, and I = 1 user
who can sense all data items. Then the problem becomes the
following: select the tasks (or data items) to be completed
within the user budget. Let us view the user budget as the
knapsack capacity, the sensing cost for each data item as the
weight of the item, and the valuation of each data item (task)
as the value of the item. It is easy to see that the problem in
this simplified model is exactly a Knapsack problem. Thus,
the general case of Problem A1 is a generalized Knapsack
problem. Note that there are many efficient algorithms for
solving Knapsack problems, either optimally or sub-optimally
[22]. Due to space limit, we will not go into the details of
these algorithms in this work.
We further notice that it is still challenging to apply the
classic algorithms to solve the Problem A1, mainly due to the
min and max operations in the equality constraints (3) and
(4). Hence, it is necessary to transform these constraints into
other equivalent forms. Formally,
Lemma 1. The equality constraint in (3) is equivalent to the
following constraints:
yk ≥ xi,k, ∀i ∈ Ik, and yk ≤
∑
i∈Ik
xi,k. (7)
Lemma 2. The constraint in (4) can be relaxed to the
following constraints without affecting the optimal solution:
zj ≤ yk, ∀k ∈ Kj . (8)
Based on the above lemmas, we can transform the Problem
A1 into the following equivalent Problem A2.
A2: max V (z)− C(x)
s.t. (1)(7)(8), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J , k ∈ K;
var. xi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ Si;
zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J ;
yk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ K.
Theorem 1. Problem A1 and Problem A2 are equivalent.
This theorem can be proved by the above two lemmas
directly. Moreover, by transforming the Problem A1 into an
equivalent and solvable Problem A2, we can adopt the classic
algorithms for Knapsack problems directly into our problem.
For notational convenience, we denote the optimal solution of
the Problem A2 (or A1) by {xo,yo, zo}.
IV. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
In this section, we consider the information asymmetry
scenario, where the data requirement and valuation of a
task are the private information of the task planner, and the
sensing capability, sensing cost, and budget are the private
information of each user, both of which cannot be observed
by the platform. Hence, the key problem is to design a truthful
mechanism to elicit the private information of task planners
and users, and meanwhile to achieve the optimal task-data-user
assignment as under information symmetry.
A. Double Auction Framework
Inspired by the VCG mechanism [23], we propose a VCG-
based double auction mechanism for eliciting the private
information of users and task planners. In the proposed double
auction, the MCS platform acts as the auctioneer,3 employing
mobile users (bidders on one side) for sensing different data
items and selling the sensed data items to the required tasks
(bidders on the other side). Different from a traditional VCG
mechanism where the private information often resides on one
side (either sellers or buyers) of the market, in our model the
private information resides on both the user side (sellers) and
the task plan side (buyers).
3The auctioneer can also be acted by any other third-party network node.
A typical VCG auction framework mainly consists of an as-
signment rule (e.g., for deciding the assignment of buyers and
sellers) and a payment rule (e.g., for deciding the payments
of buyers) [23]. The payment rule is carefully designed such
that bidders will report the private information truthfully. In
our double auction framework, due to the two-sided private
information, we need to design not only a payment rule (for
deciding the payments of task planners), but also a reward
rule (for deciding the rewards for users). The payment rule is
used to guarantee the truthful information disclosure of task
planners, while the reward rule is used to guarantee the truthful
information disclosure of users.
Before presenting the detailed double auction rule, we first
provide some important notations. Denote
tj , {Kj , vj} and ti , {Si, ci, Ci}
as true information of task j ∈ J and user i ∈ I. Denote
bj , {K˜j , v˜j} and bi , {S˜i, c˜i, C˜i}
as the reported information (bids) of task j ∈ J and user i ∈
I, respectively. For convenience, we further denote bTASK ,
(bj , j ∈ J ) and bUSER , (bi, i ∈ I) as the bids of all task
planners and users, respectively. Obviously, if the proposed
auction is truthful, we will have: bj = tj and bi = ti.
With a little abuse of notations, we denote
x(·) , (xi(·), i ∈ I) and z(·) , (zj(·), j ∈ J ) (9)
as the assignment rule, where x(·) is the user scheduling rule
and z(·) is the task completion rule. We further denote
p(·) , (pj(·), j ∈ J ) (10)
as the payment rule for task planners, where pj(·) denotes the
payment of each task planner j ∈ J . Similarly, we denote
r(·) , (ri(·), i ∈ I) (11)
as the reward rule for users, where ri(·) denotes the reward
for each user i ∈ I. Based on the above, we can write such
an auction mechanism as follows:
Ω , {x(·), z(·), p(·), r(·)}. (12)
Note that x(·), z(·), p(·), and r(·) are all functions of bUSER
and bTASK , hence can also be written as x(bUSER , bTASK),
z(bUSER , bTASK), p(bUSER , bTASK), and r(bUSER , bTASK).
B. Truthful Double Auction
Now we provide the detailed assignment rule, payment rule,
and reward rule for our proposed double auction Ω, based on
the key idea of VCG auction [23].
Definition 1 (Assignment Rule). The assignment rule
x(bUSER , bTASK) and z(bUSER , bTASK) is given by:
x(bUSER , bTASK) = x
o(bUSER , bTASK) (13)
and
z(bUSER , bTASK) = z
o(bUSER , bTASK), (14)
where {xo(bUSER , bTASK), zo(bUSER , bTASK)} is the optimal so-
lution to Problem A2 by replacing the true information (ti, i ∈
I) and (tj , j ∈ J ) with the reported bids bUSER and bTASK .
Definition 2 (Payment Rule). The payment rule
p(bUSER , bTASK) for task planners is given by:
p(bUSER , bTASK) =
(
poj(bUSER , bTASK), j ∈ J
)
, (15)
where the payment of task planner j is
poj(bUSER , bTASK) , W
o
−j(bUSER , bTASK)
−
∑
l∈J /{j}
zol (bUSER , bTASK) · vl
+
∑
i∈I
∑
k⊆Si
xoi,k(bUSER , bTASK) · ci,k,
andW o−j(bUSER , bTASK) is the maximum social welfare (defined
on bids bUSER and bTASK ) excluding task planer j.
4
Definition 3 (Reward Rule). The reward rule r(bUSER , bTASK)
for users is given by:
r(bUSER , bTASK) = (r
o
i (bUSER , bTASK), i ∈ I) , (16)
where the reward to user i is
roi (bUSER , bTASK) ,
∑
j∈J
zoj (bUSER , bTASK) · vj
−
∑
l∈I/{i}
∑
k⊆Sl
xol,k(bUSER , bTASK) · cl,k
−W o−i(bUSER , bTASK),
andW o−i(bUSER , bTASK) is the maximum social welfare (defined
on bids bUSER and bTASK ) excluding user i.
It is easy to prove that the double auction Ω defined on
Definition 1–3 is truthful and optimal (i.e., achieving the same
optimal social welfare as under information symmetry).
Theorem 2. The double auction mechanism Ω given by (13)–
(16) is truthful and optimal.
The proof for truthfulness is standard and can be referred to
our technical report [25]. The optimality can be easily shown
by Definition 1, together with the truthfulness.
C. Budget Balance
Now we discuss the budget balance property of the proposed
auction, which is important for incentivizing the auctioneer
(platform) to organize such an auction.
Specifically, an auction is said to be (weakly) budget bal-
ance, if the total payment collected from the task planners is no
smaller than the total reward assigned to the users, hence the
platform will not lose money by organizing such an auction.5
Therefore, budget balance is a highly desirable property for
4Specifically, W o
−j(bUSER , bTASK) is the maximizer of Problem A2, by
replacing the true information (ti, i ∈ I) and (tj , j ∈ J ) with the reported
bids bUSER and bTASK , and meanwhile excluding task planer j.
5An auction is said to be strictly budget balance, if the total payment
collected from the task planners equals the total reward assigned to the users.
our auction, otherwise the platform may lose the interest of
organizing such an auction.
Unfortunately, our proposed double auction is not budget
balance, mainly due to the data reuse among tasks. Specif-
ically, the data reuse among tasks reduces the competition
among tasks, hence potentially reduces the payments of task
planners (which is a common result in VCG), leading to
the undesired budget imbalance. This can be shown by the
following simple example: (i) Two tasks requiring a same data
item with v1 = 0.5 and v2 = 0.6, and (ii) One user can sense
the data with cost c = 0.2. According to the assignment rule in
(13) and (14), the user will be scheduled the data item and both
tasks will be completed, hence the maximum social welfare is
0.5 + 0.6 − 0.2 = 0.9. According to the reward rule in (16),
the user will receive a reward of 0.5 + 0.6 − 0 − 0 = 1.1.
According to the payment rule in (15), task 1 will be charged
a payment of 0.4− 0.6+ 0.2 = 0, and task 2 will be charged
a payment of 0.3 − 0.5 + 0.2 = 0. This coincides with the
common results in classic VCG mechanisms, where a task
not generating harmful impact to the rest of the market often
does not need to pay money. Obviously, in this example, the
platform losses a total money of 1.1.
To this end, we introduce a reserve price for each data item
in the proposed double auction, which denotes the minimal
payment that a task planer has to pay for each data item. Let
pik ≥ 0 denote the reserve price for each data item k ∈ K.
Then, for each task planner j ∈ J , his minimum payment (if
task j is completed) can be calculated by:
p
j
=
∑
k∈Kj
pik. (17)
Based on the above, we propose the following new payment
rule p†(bUSER , bTASK) for task planners.
Definition 4 (Payment Rule with Reserve Price). The new
payment rule p†(bUSER , bTASK) for task planners is given by:
p†(bUSER , bTASK) =
(
p
†
j(bUSER , bTASK), j ∈ J
)
, (18)
where the payment of task planner j is
p
†
j(bUSER , bTASK) , max{p
o
j(bUSER , bTASK), pj},
where poj(bUSER , bTASK) is given in Definition 3.
We will show that the double auction Ω† with the reserve
price given in (18) is still truthful, but may be not optimal.
Theorem 3. The double auction mechanism Ω† given by
(13)(14)(16)(18) is truthful (but not optimal).
The proof for truthfulness is still standard and can be
referred to our technical report [25]. The impact of the reserve
price on optimality can be shown as follows. With the reserve
price, some task planners, i.e., those with a valuation lower
than the minimum payment given in (17), will decide to not
join the auction. Hence, the maximum social welfare may
be reduced. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the social
efficiency and the budget balance. A larger reserve price may
lead to a better budget balance, but to a worse social efficiency.
We will show the impacts of reserve price on the budget
balance and the social efficiency via simulations.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Now we provide simulation results to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our proposed double auction mechanism.
A. Simulation Setup
To compare our proposed double auction with the random-
ized auction in [19], we consider a similar simulation setting as
in [19], with I = 8 tasks, I = 8 users, andK ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}
target data items. Each data item is location-based and dis-
tributed in an area of 10km×10km randomly and uniformly.
Each user is associated with a random location and can sense
the data items within a distance of 5km to his location. Each
task requires 5 data items randomly picked from the whole
target data set. The sensing cost ci,k of each user i for each
data item k is selected from [0, 1] randomly and uniformly,
and the total sensing budget Ci of user i is selected from
[0, 5] randomly and uniformly. The valuation vj,k of each task
j for each data item k that it requires is selected from [0, 1.5]
randomly and uniformly, and the total valuation vj of task j
is the sum of valuations on all required data items.
B. Social Welfare Gain
We first illustrate the social welfare gain due to data reuse
among tasks, comparing with those without data reuse.
Figure 2 shows the maximum social welfare without data
reuse and with data reuse among tasks, under different number
of data items. For the case with data reuse, we further compare
the social welfares achieved by our proposed double auction
(which is provably optimal) and by the randomized auction
in [19] (which is approximately optimal). We can see that the
social welfare increases with the number of data items without
data reuse, while decreases with the number of data items with
data reuse. The reason is as follows. With a smaller set of data
items, tasks are more likely to require the same data item.
Hence, with data reuse, they can potentially reuse a larger set
of common data items, resulting in a lower sensing cost and
hence a higher social welfare; without data reuse, however,
the competition among tasks become more intensive (as the
common data has to be sensed distinctly for each task), leading
to a potentially lower social welfare.
Figure 3 further shows the social welfare gain due to data
reuse among tasks, comparing with those without data reuse.
We can see that the social welfare gain can be up to 380% ∼
100% by our proposed double auction, and 370% ∼ 80% by
the randomized auction in [19], when the number of data items
changes from 5 to 20. That is, our proposed double auction
has an average of 10% performance gain over the randomized
auction in [19]. When the number of data items is very large,
there will be no common data requirement among tasks (hence
no data reuse), and thus the social welfare gain due to data
reuse will go to zero, which implies that the social welfares
with and without data reuse are same.
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C. Platform Budget
We now illustrate the impacts of the reserve price on the
platform budget and the social welfare. We will show that
a well-designed reserve price can achieve a desired tradeoff
between budget balance and social efficiency.
Figure 4 shows the social welfare and the platform budget
under different reserve prices. For clarity, we also present the
total task payment and the total user reward in the figure, and
the platform budget is just the difference between the total task
payment and user reward. We can see that the social welfare
always decreases with the reserve price, while the platform
budget first increases and then decreases with the reserve price.
The reason is as follows. Note that a task planner will leave
the auction, if his task valuation is lower than the minimum
payment defined in (17), i.e., the sum of reserve price on all
required data items. Thus, with the increasing of the reserve
price, more task planners are likely to leave the auction,
resulting in a lower social welfare. Moreover, when the reserve
price increases from a small level, most task planners still stay
in the auction, and hence the platform budget increases due to
the increased payment from task planners; when the reserve
price increases from a high level, many task planners leave
the auction, hence the platform budget decreases due to the
decreased number of task planners. Besides, when the reserve
price is very large (e.g., 1.5 in the figure), almost all of the
task planners will leave the auction, leading to a zero social
welfare and a zero platform budget.
Figure 4 also shows the minimum reserve price that achieves
the platform budget balance, i.e., that leading to a zero budget
for the platform (i.e., 0.38 in the figure). We can see that
under such a reserve price (which achieves the strict budget
balance), the social welfare loss is less than 2%, comparing
with the maximum social welfare under the zero reserve price.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we consider a novel MCS framework, where
different tasks may have the common data requirement and
can reuse the common data through a MCS platform. We
study the optimal assignment among mobile users and sensing
tasks (with data sharing) under both information symmetry and
asymmetry. In particular, we propose a truthful and optimal
double auction mechanism under information asymmetry. We
further introduce a reserve price to achieve a desired tradeoff
between the budget balance and the social efficiency. There
are several interesting directions for future research. First, it
is meaningful to consider more practical valuation model for
tasks and cost model for users. Second, it is also important to
study the approximate algorithm for solving the inherit NP-
hard assignment problem.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Ma, D. Zhao, and P. Yuan, “Opportunities in mobile crowd sensing,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, 52(8):29-35, 2014.
[2] WeatherLah, http://www.weatherlah.com/.
[3] OpenSense Project, http://www.nano-tera.ch/projects/401.php/.
[4] Intel Urban Atmosphere, http://www.urban-atmospheres.net/.
[5] OpenSignal, http://opensignal.com/.
[6] NoiseTube, http://www.noisetube.net/.
[7] Sensorly, http://www.sensorly.com/.
[8] Waze: Free GPS Navigation with Turn by Turn, https://www.waze.com/.
[9] Mobile Millennium, http://traffic.berkeley.edu/.
[10] B. Hull, V. Bychkovsky, Y. Zhang, et al., “CarTel: A Distributed Mobile
Sensor Computing System,” in Prof. ACM SenSys, 2006.
[11] SpotSwitch, http://spotswitch.com/.
[12] S. Mathur, T. Jin, N. Kasturirangan, et al., “ParkNet: Drive-by Sensing
of Road-side Parking Statistics,” in Prof. ACM MobiSys, 2010.
[13] L. Duan, et al., “Incentive mechanisms for smartphone collaboration in
data acquisition and distributed computing,” IEEE INFOCOM, 2012.
[14] D. Yang, et al., “Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism
design for mobile phone sensing,” in Proc. ACM MOBICOM, Aug. 2012.
[15] T. Luo and C.-K. Tham, “Fairness and social welfare in incentivizing
participatory sensing,” in Proc. IEEE SECON, June 2012.
[16] Z. Feng, et al., “TRAC: truthful auction for location-aware collaborative
sensing in mobile crowdsourcing,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2014.
[17] C. Jiang, L. Gao, L. Duan, and J. Huang, “Economics of Peer-to-Peer
Mobile Crowdsensing,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2015.
[18] L. Gao, F. Hou, and J. Huang, “Providing long-term participation
incentive in participatory sensing,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2015.
[19] C. Jiang, L. Gao, L. Duan, and J. Huang, “Exploiting Data Reuse in
Mobile Crowdsensing,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2016.
[20] T. Das, et al., “PRISM: platform for remote sensing using smartphones,”
in Proc. ACM MobiSys, June 2010.
[21] M.-R. Ra, et al., “Medusa: a programming framework for crowd-sensing
applications,” in Proc. ACM MobiSys, June 2012.
[22] H. Kellerer, U. Pferschy, and D. Pisinger, Knapsack Problems, Springer
2004.
[23] N. Nisan and A. Ronen, “Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms,”
J. Artif. Intell. Res., vol. 29, pp.19-47, May 2007.
[24] L. Breslau, et al., “Web caching and Zipf-like distributions: evidence
and implications,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Mar. 1999.
[25] Online Technical Report, url:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ii4ncjocecx9quw/AppendixCS.pdf?dl=0
Online technical report for “A Double Auction Mechanism
for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Data Reuse” submitted to
IEEE GLOBECOM 2017. Outline of the report:
• A: Proof for Lemma 1
• B: Proof for Lemma 2
• C: Proof for Theorem 1
• D: Proof for Theorem 2
• E: Proof for Theorem 3
APPENDIX
A. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. We consider two cases: (i) xi,k = 0, ∀i ∈ Ik, and (ii)
there exists at least one i ∈ Ik with xi,k = 1. In the first
case, we have yk = 0 by both (3) and (7). In the second case,
we have yk = 1 by both (3) and (7). Hence, (3) and (7) are
equivalent with each other.
B. Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. We consider two cases: (i) yk = 1, ∀k ∈ Kj , and (ii)
there exists at least one k ∈ Kj with yk = 1. In the first case,
we have zj = 1 by (4). It is easy to check that the optimal zj
under the constraint (8) is also zj = 1 due to the definition of
V (z) in (5). In the second case, we have zj = 0 by both (4)
and (8). Hence, relaxing (4) to (8) does not affect the optimal
solution.
C. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can prove the theorem
directly.
D. Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Proof for Truthfulness: It is easy to see that the
payment rules given by (15) and (16) follow the basic principle
of VCG mechanism [23], where each bidder (task planner or
user) is charged by his critical bid, i.e., the harm they cause
to other bidders. According to the classic results in [23], each
bidder will report his private information truthfully.
Proof for Optimality: Based on the above, each bidder will
report his private information truthfully. Thus, the assignment
rule given by (13) and (14) is optimal, that is, it maximizes
the social welfare.
E. Proof for Theorem 3
Proof. Similar as the proof for Theorem 2, we can easily find
that the payment rules given by (16) and (18) follow the basic
principle of VCG mechanism [23], where each bidder (task
planner or user) is charged by his critical bid, i.e., the harm
they cause to other bidders. Thus, by the classic results in [23],
each bidder will report his private information truthfully.
